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ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes two models of social support
for totalitarian social movements, the mass society model, and
the class conflict or interest group model. Using national sur-
vey data, the authors formulate and test the implications of each
of these models in terms of generating support for police vio-
lence among the mass public. With the exception of a positive
relationship between education and rejection of police violence,
the mass society model is not well supported by the data exam-
ined by the authors. Generally strong support is present for
the class conflict model.
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DURING the winter of 1970, a-L-~ United Press International corre-
spondent was taken into custody by
police and held for twenty hours. He
had been covering a student riot in
Santa Barbara. During the period he
was detained he was neither formally
charged nor allowed to make a phone
call. &dquo;War correspondents,&dquo; California
Governor Ronald Reagan explained with
a grin, &dquo;have to realize that sometime
they are going to get it.... He should
be happy he was captured by the good
guys.&dquo; 1
For many Americans, there is appar-
ently a thin blue line between order and
chaos. Breach it and untold furies lie
beyond. The police require uncondi-
tional support when they are in combat;
sins are understandable and forgivable
when they occur in the stress of battle.
For others, of course, it is a quite
different story. The police are a crude
instrument of power, often failing to dif-
ferentiate between criminals and by-
standers and full of barely controlled
aggressive impulses. Norman Mailer
expresses this view eloquently in his
description at the time of the 1968
Democratic Convention.
Every public figure with power, every city
official, high politician, or prominent gov-
ernment worker knows in his unspoken
sentiments that the police are an essentially
criminal force restrained by their guilt,
their covert awareness that they are im-
posters, and by a sprinkling of career men
whose education, rectitude, athletic ability,
and religious dedication make them work for
a balance between justice and authority.2
This paper explores the sources of
public support and opposition to police
violence. The most highly publicized
police violence of the last decade has
taken place in a political context with
the police confronting organized groups
rather than isolated individuals. Since
police frequently appear in such con-
flicts as protagonists, attitudes toward
them are likely to be closely bound to
support and opposition to the social
movements that have occurred within
American society during this period.
Hence, we start with the more general
issue of the nature of social movements
before turning to the more specific phe-
nomenon of attitudes toward the police.
SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
Two broad orientations run through
efforts to understand the sources of sup-
port for such movements as the radical
right, student activism, black power,
and the like. One orientation has roots
in the theory of mass society and views
the recruitment to such movements as
primarily reactive. Potential supporters
presumably become available to a move-
ment because they are supposed victims
of social strains or personal anxieties.
In addition, certain social controls are
thought to be absent for these individu-
als, making them especially promising
targets for mobilization by the leaders
of mass movements.
The second orientation has roots in
class or conflict group analyses and
views the recruitment to these move-
ments as more proactive. Rather than
being acted upon, the participants are
seen as goal-directed actors pursuing
social change through collective action.
At the risk of overdrawing the differ-
ences, we will attempt to sketch these
two orientations as competing models.
Reactive Model
The reactive model is characterized
by weak social attachments and per-
sonal vulnerability.
In this model, there are two steps lead-
ing to participation in mass movements.
1. Reported in the San Francisco Chronicle,
Wednesday, March 4, 1970.
2. Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of
Chicago (Cleveland: World Publishing Co.,
1968), p. 175.
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The first of these is the formation
of an aggregate of individuals who are
psychologically ready for participation.
Readiness to participate comes from the
absence of those conditions that con-
strain others from involvement in essen-
tially irrational forms of political action.
In this model, the mass movement par-
ticipant presumably lacks the series of
institutional affiliations and group loyal-
ties that bind people into the political
system and create loyalty to it. Those
who are heavily embedded in such inter-
mediate associations are less available
for new loyalties. Those who are
weakly attached and are peripheral to
existing social networks are &dquo;loose&dquo; in
the system. Being loose, there are
few constraints preventing the develop-
ment of support for proffered social
movements.
Being unconstrained, however, is only
part of the story. Mass movements
must also promise to meet some impor-
tant need to energize the unattached,
potential recruit. Several different mo-
tivational bases have been suggested
but, for our purposes, it is unnecessary
to distinguish among them. We will use
them here as examples of the same
basic argument.
One might, for example, emphasize
the personal anxiety that results from
lack of strong social attachments. Par-
ticipation in a mass movement provides
the emotional satisfaction of being part
of a group with strong solidarity-a
satisfaction that the participant lacks
prior to his participation. In this argu-
ment, participation in a movement fills
an important psychological need of be-
longingness ; Fromm and Hoffer write
in this spirit.3 3
A structural example might empha-
size status insecurity. Individuals occu-
pying marginal social positions may ex-
perience common strains as social change
occurs. Among these groups losing
status in society, it will be especially
those individuals with weak and con-
flicting group loyalties who will manifest
these strains to the greatest degree.
Those with inconsistent statuses, for ex-
ample, may find that their claims based
on their higher status characteristic are
no longer socially validated; at the same
time, they reject the lower status group
into which they are moving and the psy-
chological support that it might provide.
Hence, their social marginality gives
them a special kind of psychological
vulnerability. There are other potential
sources of status insecurity besides that
of objectively inconsistent statuses but
the argument is, in general, similar: By
the symbolism and the meaning they
give his social condition, by their myth
of a better future, by the camaraderie
and group support they provide, mass
movements supply some important sat-
isfactions for the unattached and vul-
nerable individual. Kornhauser and
many of the authors in The Radical
Right argue along these lines.4 4
Note that the participants in mass
movements are primarily reactive in this
model. A major part of the dynamic of
mobilization is supposed to be provided
by elites and, in some cases, demagogues
who skillfully exploit the vulnerabilities
of the masses for their own political
ends. The primary empirical implica-
tion of this argument is that degree of
social attachment will be negatively as-
sociated with support for social move-
ments. In addition, degree of insecurity
about one’s social identity and degree of
3. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom
(New York: Rinehart and Co., 1941) ; Eric
Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the
Nature of Mass Movements (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1951).
4. See especially Daniel Bell, Seymour Mar-
tin Lipset, and Richard Hofstadter in Daniel
Bell, ed., The Radical Right (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964); and William Korn-
hauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New
York: Free Press, 1959).
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social marginality should be positively
associated with movement support.
Proactive Model
The proactive model is characterized
by conflict groups and group identifi-
cation.
The mechanisms invoked in this sec-
ond model are much more conventional.
Participation in a social movement is
assumed to involve much the same proc-
ess as group participation in general.
Those most available for participation
will be those who are not handicapped
by constraints such as cross-pressures or
social isolation. Thus, the more socially
imbedded one is in a group, the more
likely he is to become involved in a so-
cial movement that involves the group’s
interest.
Note the underlying assumptions here
about social movements. They are
seen to embody challenges by relatively
powerless groups. These challenging
groups are the activist portion of some
underlying solidary group. They repre-
sent a constituency on behalf of whom
they are attempting to change the soci-
ety. Much of their effort centers on the
mobilization of this constituency and its
conversion into an active political force.
This political struggle takes the form of
a mass movement because the groups
involved initially lack the scale of or-
ganization, access, and appropriate re-
sponse to operate effectively inside the
existing political arena. If they ulti-
mately acquire such access and re-
sources, their organizational strategy
will shift from that of a mass movement
to the tactics of conventional politics.
This model assumes, then, that if
groups were equal in their access to re-
sources and were all well integrated into
the political system, there would be little
occasion for collective action outside of
institutional channels. To a greater
or lesser degree in different societies,
however, political integration is not uni-
form among social groups. Groups with
less access forge their own instruments
of change and, in American society, this
often takes the form of a mass move-
ment. Tilly, Gamson, and Rogin write
in this spirit.5 5
The activists in this political struggle
are those members of the challenging
group that most strongly identify with
and are most strongly embedded in the
group. Those with the weakest group
attachments will be less likely to be
drawn into participation. In contrast
with the previous model, this one is
proactive; and the mass movement is
viewed essentially as an instrumental
form of organization by a group that
lacks institutional power. The leaders
are not &dquo;outsiders&dquo; who are using the
movement for their own, separate pur-
poses but &dquo;insiders&dquo; who embody the
group’s norms and values.
Thus, the empirical implications
concerning group attachment contrast
sharply with the first model. If a move-
ment embodies a challenging group’s
interest, then the participants will tend
to be those who are most strongly at-
tached to the group. Those who are
peripheral, who are socially isolated,
cross-pressured, or otherwise marginal
will be the least likely to participate in
movement activities.
McCdrthyism, Goldwater Support, and
Student Activism
Both models may be helpful in ex-
plaining a given social movement, up to
a point. Movements may change their
5. Charles Tilly, "From Mobilization to Po-
litical Conflict," multilith (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University of Michigan, 1970) ; William A.
Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood,
Ill.: Dorsey, 1968) and "Stable Unrepresenta-
tion in American Society," American Behav-
ioral Scientist 12 (Nov.-Dec., 1968) 15-21;
Michael Paul Rogin, The Intellectuals and
McCarthy: The Radical Specter (Cambridge,
Mass.: M.LT. Press, 1967).
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character, appealing at one time to rela-
tive social isolates and at another to
those with strong loyalties to a chal-
lenging group. Or, one wing of a com-
plex movement may be best understood
by one model while another part of it
is handled by the other. Having con-
ceded this, however, it is difficult for
both to be generally correct, because
they differ in their assumptions about
the basic nature of the phenomenon
being explained.
Take the case of McCarthyism in the
early 1950’s. Labeling McCarthy sup-
porters as members of the &dquo;radical
right&dquo; rather than as &dquo;conservative&dquo;
invokes the first model. Bell, Hof-
stader, Lipset, and other students of
Joe McCarthy’s support emphasized
status anxiety as the underlying cause
of participation in the movement.6
&dquo;Communists in government&dquo; provided
a psychologically rewarding (i.e., sim-
plistic) conspiratorial explanation and
scapegoat for the alleged insecurities
and anxieties that the McCarthy fol-
lowers were supposed to be experiencing.
Recently, however, Rogin has taken a
fresh look at the McCarthy phenomenon
and his analysis suggests that the pro-
active model is more appropriate. A
close look at county voting records and
at other evidence leads him to conclude
that &dquo;McCarthy capitalized on popular
concern over foreign policy, communism,
and the Korean War, but the animus
of McCarthyism had little to do with
any less political or more developed
popular anxieties.... McCarthy did
not split apart an elite, the parts of
which had been equally conservative
before him. He rather capitalized on
an existing liberal/conservative split
within the existing Republican elite.&dquo; 7
Polsby’s analysis of poll data points
in the same general direction. Party
affiliation is the single best predictor
of support for McCarthy-Democrats
opposed him and Republicans supported
him.8 Rogin concludes from his
own review, &dquo;In these polls, as in the
data reported by Polsby, no other single
division of the population (by religion,
class, education, and so forth) even ap-
proached the party split.&dquo; 9
Rogin rejects the notion that Mac-
Carthy was sustained primarily by the
vague discontents of frustrated groups.
&dquo;McCarthy had powerful group and elite
support. He did not mobilize the
masses at the polls or break through
existing group cleavages.... Commu-
nism and the Korean War played crucial
roles.&dquo; 10 Strange as it may seem, the
issues on which McCarthy mobilized
support were apparently real ones for his
followers, not merely symbolic of private
anxieties.
The first model is also a popular ap-
paratus for explaining the support for
Senator Goldwater in 1964. It was fre-
quently assumed that the early sup-
porters of Goldwater were anomic,
institutionally detached &dquo;cranks,&dquo; neo-
fascists, or &dquo;infiltrators&dquo; into the Re-
publican Party. &dquo;Little old ladies in
tennis shoes&dquo; became the popular phrase
to capture the lunatic fringe imagery.
McEvoy has demonstrated that the
evidence sharply contradicts this image
of the Goldwater phenomenon.ll Pre-
convention supporters of Goldwater were
compared on a number of variables with
those who ultimately voted for him even
though they had preferred another
nominee prior to the convention. The
early Goldwater supporters were very
6. See Bell, op. cit.
7. Rogin, op. cit., pp. 216, 220.
8. Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward an Explana-
tion of McCarthyism," Political Studies 8
(October, 1960), 250-271.
9. Rogin, op. cit., p. 234.
10. Ibid., p. 268.
11. James C. McEvoy, Radicals or Con-
servatives ? The Contemporary American Right
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).
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significantly higher on such variables as
church attendance, income level, and
education. They were more likely to be
married. Furthermore, they were much
higher in past participation in Repub-
lican Party politics. Finally, they ex-
hibited average to low levels of objective
status discrepancy. None of this evi-
dence suggests lack of attachment; on
the contrary, early Goldwater support-
ers seem to be strong conservatives with
social support and respect from their
friends and neighbors. 12
The persistence of social science sup-
port for the reactive model in the ab-
sence of much data that support it sug-
gests something about its ideological
biases. It typically has a pejorative
ring, suggesting that supporters of a
political movement are irrationally seek-
ing simple, illusory solutions for com-
plex problems. Since social scientists
who study right-wing movements are
typically hostile to them, this model
readily suggests itself and receives far
less critical examination than it deserves.
When attention turns to movements
of the left, there is much less tendency
to invoke the reactive model. Although
the McCone Commission Report on the
Watts riot suggested that rioters were
recent migrants with weak attachment
to the community, social scientists were
quick to test and demolish this hypothe-
sis.~3 Similarly, this model has failed to
gain a foothold as an explanation of stu-
dent activists. While popular articles
about student &dquo;rebels&dquo; may have postu-
lated their personal maladjustment, seri-
ous studies put this myth to rest. Stu-
dent activists, it turns out, are not the
most marginal members of the student
body but those most embedded in many
aspects of life at the university. They
are not academic failures, psychological
wrecks, or social isolates, but those with
better than average academic perform-
ance, with more liberal parents, with
higher self-esteem, and with friends who
have similar political views. They are,
in short, well socialized and personally
well-adjusted members of politically
militant sub-groups in the university. 14
We do not mean to imply here that
activists are &dquo;typical&dquo; students, but
merely that they are actively and cen-
trally involved in life at the univer-
sity-in fact, more so than the typical
student.
In all the above studies, the evidence
seems more nearly to support the pro-
active model. We would not argue that
this is necessarily true for all recruits
to social movements. But at this point,
we would be skeptical any time the re-
active model is invoked to explain a
movement when the person who invokes
it is far removed from or unsympathetic
to the movement or the issue in question.
MEASURING SUPPORT FOR
POLICE VIOLENCE
The models discussed above apply
rather generally to social movements.
The issue of police violence, we argue,
must be viewed in this more general
context. Police may play two different
roles in group conflict situations. They
may take a relatively neutral posture,
remaining on the sidelines as much as
possible and operating to make sure that
the means of carrying on conflict remain
12. The weak attachment model might con-
ceivably account for some "deviant" Gold-
water supporters&mdash;that is, supporters from
areas where few people were sympathetic.
13. See, for example, Nathan Caplan and
Jeffery M. Paige, "A Study of Ghetto Rioters,"
Scientific American (August, 1968), 15-21, and
Jeffery M. Paige, Collective Violence and the
Culture of Subordination (Ph.D. diss., Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1968).
14. See the various articles in Edward E.
Sampson, ed., Stirrings Out of Apathy: Stu-
dent Activism and the Decade of Protest,
special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 23
(July, 1967), for documentation of this point.
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within certain limits. Or, they may be
used as a partisan instrument or ally
of one group in the conflict. The
latter role is especially likely when the
conflict is between the authorities and
those challenging them.
Our underlying concern in this paper
is with the presence or absence of con-
straint on the use of police as a partisan
instrument against challenging groups.
One aspect of this constraint is the
climate of opinion that is reflected in
public attitudes toward police violence.
By understanding where the sources of
public support and opposition to police
violence are located, we can understand
something about the nature and strength
of this possible source of constraint on
police behavior. The two models dis-
cussed above, as we will argue shortly,
have direct implications for this issue.
Before considering this, we turn to a
description of our data and our measure
of support and opposition for police
violence.
The data we report were obtained
from a national cross-section probability
sample of adult Americans conducted for
the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, by Louis
Harris Associates of New York in Octo-
ber, 1968.15 The sample consists of
1176 completed interviews and is more
fully described in Kirkham, Levy, and
Crotty, and McEvoy.&dquo;5
The interview schedule contained a
section of 25 statements about violence
in various contexts-personal, political,
international, and so forth. Respon-
dents were asked to express varying de-
grees of agreement or disagreement with
each statement. A factor analysis of
the entire set identified several distinct
clusters, including one that we have
labeled &dquo;police violence.&dquo; This factor
showed high loadings on three items:
1. The police are wrong to beat up
unarmed protestors, even when these
people are rude and call them names.
(Factor loading: .79)
2. The police frequently use more
force than they need to when carrying
out their duties. (Factor loading: .62)
3. Any man who insults a policeman
has no complaint if he gets roughed-up
in return. (reversed item, Factor load-
ing : .61).
The overall distribution on these three
items is included in Table 1. A score
on support for police violence was com-
puted for each individual by reversing
the direction of the third item and sum-
ming it with scores on the other two
items. These total scores were then
reduced to a seven-point scale, with high
scores representing greater favorableness
toward police violence. The distribution
of the sample on this index is reported
in Table 2.
RESULTS
Our attempts to explain the variation
in the index of support for police vio-
lence will be guided by two models de-
rived from the more general models
described in the first section of this
paper.
Reactive Model
In this argument, we suggest that
police violence raises a fundamental
question for our respondents: Do they
see police as embodying the law, or as
subject to its constraints like other citi-
zens ? To appreciate this second view,
one must embrace a complex normative
principle. Those who have allegiance
to it resemble those who are usually
15. McEvoy served as special consultant to
the Commission Task Force on Political
Assassination.
16. James Kirkhan, Sheldon Levy, and Wil-
liam J. Crotty, Assassination and Political
Violence, A Report to the National Commis-
sion on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
(Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1969), and
McEvoy, Radicals or Conservatives? op. cit.
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TABLE 1-DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEMS IN POLICE VIOLENCE INDEX
~~~~ ~
found to support principles of civil liber-
ties. This means, especially, those who
are well educated and have other charac-
teristics associated with high normative
integration into the political system.
More specifically, this model implies
the following hypotheses: 17
1 ) The higher the educational level,
the more opposition to police vio-
lence.
2) Assuming that whites are higher
in normative integration than
blacks, whites will be more op-
posed to police violence than
blacks.
3) Registered voters will be more
opposed to police violence than
those who are not registered.
4) People who identify with a major
political party will be more op-
posed to police violence than those
who lack such identification.
Proactive Model
In this argument, the police violence
index primarily taps trust in the police.
During periods of sharp challenge to the
distribution of power and privilege in a
society, the police tend to be used as a
partisan instrument in defense of privi-
lege. When this happens, they usually
become agents of established groups and
opponents of challenging groups. Gam-
son defines trust in these terms: &dquo;Con-
fidence in authorities means that they
are perceived as the group’s agents, that
the group members identify with them.
... Alienation from authorities means
that ... they are ... the agents of
groups with conflicting goals.&dquo; 1$
The past decade has been a period of
high conflict between challenging groups
and authorities. Consequently, indi-
viduals will differ sharply in trust of the
police, depending on whether they are
part of groups attacking the established
order or of groups defending it. Not
only will group memberships determine
attitudes toward the police, but the
strength of group identifications and at-
tachments will determine the degree of
such support.&dquo;
17. It implies many others beyond those
stated here. However, we confine ourselves to
those hypotheses that our data enable us
to test.
18. Gamson, op. cit., pp. 54, 56.
19. Unfortunately, we lack the data to test
this part of the argument here.
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More specifically, this model implies
the following hypotheses:
1) Blacks will be more opposed to
police violence than whites.
2 ) Young people will be more op-
posed to police violence than older
people.
3 ) Poor people will be more opposed
to police violence than rich people.
4) Financially dissatisfied people will
be more opposed to police violence
than financially satisfied people.
Table 3 presents a series of bivariate
relationships between the police violence
index and the variables suggested by the
hypotheses listed above. It should come
as no great surprise to most readers that
race sharply differentiates toward police
violence: blacks are much more likely
to be against police violence than are
whites. Furthermore, there is some ad-
ditional evidence that this difference is
not merely a reflection of general dis-
trust of authority, but is more specifi-
cally directed at the police. The inter-
view schedule contained a rather extreme
item expressing political distrust: &dquo;The
government in Washington is the enemy,
not the friend, of people like me.&dquo; Only
8 percent of the whites in the sample
agree with this statement; and the per-
centage for blacks is identical. Thus,
the great difference between blacks and
whites on the police violence index
seems to reflect attitudes toward this
specific object of trust or distrust.
Education shows a moderate effect.
As education increases, so does opposi-
tion to police violence, from 31 percent
for those with less than a high school
diploma to 45 percent for college gradu-
ates. Family income shows no simple
relationship to police violence, but age
does: the younger group shows more
opposition. However, those who are
financially most dissatisfied are higher in
their opposition to police violence (42
percent) than are those who are hap-
piest with their financial position (29
percent).
As for our measures of political in-
volvement, Republican Party identifiers
show the least opposition to police vio-
lence (25 5 percent); Democrats and
those without a major party identifica-
tion are more opposed (38 percent).
Finally, those who are registered to vote
show slightly less opposition to police
violence (34 percent) than those who
are not participants in the electoral
process (40 percent).
A multivariate analysis adds some
additional information. Chart 1 pre-
sents the interaction between education
and race. The figures in this chart
represent the percentage of respondents
in each category who fall at the anti-
violence end of the index (categories
0-2). Education has no additional ef-
fect for blacks; those at all educational
levels are opposed to police violence.
For whites, education has some explana-
tory power; the percentage of whites
opposed to police violence increases from
19 in the lowest group to 43 in the
highest but remains considerably short
of the overall black figure of 70.
Given the importance of race and of
TABLE 2-DEGREE OF SUPPORT OF POLICE VIOLENCE
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education for whites, Table 4 controls
for these variables in exploring the rela-
tionship between the police violence
index and several other relevant vari-
ables. Family income still shows no
consistent relationship; at best, there is
a slight suggestion that whites in the
lowest income group are more opposed
to police violence than their wealthier
counterparts at each educational level.
For blacks, the direction is reversed, and
only 51 percent of those with income
under $5,000 fall at the oppose-police-
violence end of the index. Financial
satisfaction shows a similar but more
pronounced relationship for whites-the
least satisfied are most opposed to police
violence at each educational level; there
is no clear direction on this variable for
blacks. Age differences emerge more
sharply, particularly for the college
group. Of white college graduates un-
der 30 years of age, 58 percent oppose
police violence compared to one-third of
those over age 50 with similar education.
TABLE 3-RELATIONSHIP OF SELECTED VARIABLES TO ATTITUDES
TOWARD POLICE VIOLENCE
* This column includes those in categories 0-2 in Table 2, the middle column contains category 3,
and the third column combines categories 4-6.
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CHART 1
RACE AND EDUCATION BY POLICE
VIOLENCE INDEX
The earlier results on party identifica-
tion and voting registration emerge more
clearly with race and education con-
trolled. Those without a major party
identification have the greatest opposi-
tion to police violence, while Republican
identifiers show the lowest opposition. 20
Furthermore, whites who are registered
to vote are less likely to oppose police
violence than those of the same educa-
tional level who are not registered voters.
For blacks, this relationship is reversed.
INTERPRETATION
How well do our two models handle
these results? The first model fares
rather badly. It successfully predicts
the positive relationship between educa-
tion and opposition to police violence.
However, it is not clear from this model
why blacks, who most would argue are
less normatively integrated, are so much
higher on opposition to police violence.
It seems reasonable to assume that regis-
tering to vote is a mark of integration
into the political system. If so, it is
not clear from this model why those who
are not registered to vote should be
more opposed to police violence. The
argument for the effects of major party
identification is similar; but those who
lack such identification are, if anything,
more opposed to police violence.
The second model does considerably
better. As predicted, blacks are more
opposed to police violence than whites.
Young college-educated whites are more
opposed than other whites. The hy-
pothesis concerning poor people re-
ceives equivocal support at best, with
subjective satisfaction proving a better
predictor than actual income. Perhaps
the have/have-not dimension of con-
flict is less relevant at this time than
the racial dimension.
By and large, then, the proactive
20. There are no differences on this variable,
however, for low education whites.
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TABLE 4-PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED OPPOSING POLICE
VIOLENCE BY SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED FOR
RACE AND EDUCATION FOR WHITES
Percentages include those who fall at the anti-police-violence end of the index (categories 0-2);
the number next to the percentage refers to the total number of respondents with the specified
characteristic.
model makes good sense of our data.
There is one exception to this success,
and an important one: it fails to account
for the effect of education. To the
extent that education is solely a measure
of privilege, increasing it should make
one more supportive of police violence
rather than less so. This hypothesis not
only fails to be supported but, as
Table 4 indicates, education has an ef-
fect on white attitudes even when in-
come is controlled. This suggests that,
as we might expect, there is something
about education other than the privilege
it brings that may be contributing to
attitudes toward police violence. How,
then, can this model be enlarged to
account for this additional result?
Each model treats education as an
indicator of something else-of social
integration (in the reactive model), or
of privilege (in the proactive model).
But perhaps it has an effect in its own
right, through influencing the conceptual
sophistication of the respondent. The
more highly educated the respondent,
the greater his cognitive differentiation
between the police and the law. A
highly educated respondent who is gen-
erally opposed to contemporary chal-
lenging groups may give his fealty to a
more abstract conception of the law.
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Transgressors should be treated harshly
but with due process; the legal system,
not the police, is the proper bulwark
against extra-legal dissidence.
This conception leads to recognition
that not only the control of dissidents
but also the control of the police can
become a problem. Mailer describes the
reactions to police behavior in the
streets of Chicago at the time of the
1968 Democratic convention:
What staggered the delegates who wit-
nessed the [police] attack ... on Michi-
gan avenue was that it opened the specter
of what it might mean for the police to
take over society. They might comport
themselves in such a case not as a force
of law and order, not even as a force of
repression upon civil disorder, but as a
true criminal force, chaotic, improvisa-
tional, undisciplined, and finally-suffi-
ciently aroused-uncontrollable .21
Education, we suggest, gives enough of
a glimpse of this specter to sober the
sympathetic attitudes toward the police
that the sophisticated &dquo;law and order&dquo;
supporter may have. We argued earlier
that the police violence index taps trust
in the police, and this trust is primarily
a function of privilege. For respondents
with low trust in the police-blacks, for
example-the education factor is largely
irrelevant, because differentiating be-
tween police and the law does not make
them any more trusting toward the po-
lice. Respondents with high trust in the
police but low education do not have
their support for police violence inhib-
ited by awareness of the police control
issue. But as education increases for
high trust respondents, this additional
factor becomes more salient; their incli-
nation to support police violence is
retarded by their greater awareness of
the problem of controlling the police.
CONCLUSION
Police comportment has an important
effect on the degree of violence with
which political conflicts are waged by
challenging groups. As Stinchcombe
argues,
Military control and liberty function to-
gether to stabilize political conflict. If the
violent means of conflict are made much
more expensive by effective enforcement by
the police and army, while nonviolent
means are made cheaper by the condition
of liberty, then a rational organizational
leader ... will prefer less violent means.
If the police and army are either ineffec-
tive, or enter into the conflict as full-fledged
participants themselves by denying not only
the right to riot but also the right to speak,
then the comparative effectiveness of vio-
lent means in the competitive struggle in-
creases, while the effectiveness of non-
violent means declines. Under these condi-
tions, a rational organizational leader will
choose a higher proportion of violent
means.22
It is important to ask what constraints
exist on the use of police as a partisan
instrument or ally of one group in a
conflict situation. Some of these con-
straints may be structural, including
both aspects of internal police organiza-
tion and linkages between the police and
political, economic, and other organiza-
tions. This paper does not address these
possible structural constraints but it does
raise the question of normative con-
straints on police behavior. If police
violence violates widely held norms in
American society, then a public outcry
against such behavior might serve to
constrain it and to mobilize institutional
pressure against it.
We find scant cause for optimism
21. Mailer, op. cit., p. 175.
22. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Struc-
ture and Organizations," in James G. March,
ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965), p. 176.
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about any constraint from public opin-
ion. Robinson describes what a sample
of 1,005 respondents thought about po-
lice action at the Chicago convention in
1968.23 Only 19 percent believed that
the police had used too much force; 25 
percent felt that they had not been
forceful enough, and the rest were either
satisfied with the amount of force used
or had no opinion.
Our own data have the same thrust.
With the possible exception of the effect
of education, we have not found any
support for the proposition that police
violence seriously violates American po-
litical norms. Extra-legal police actions
directed against unpopular targets are
unlikely to draw censure or even dis-
approval from those substantial seg-
ments of the American public for whom
the police are the &dquo;good guys.&dquo; And for
those who, like ourselves, see police par-
ticipation in conflicts in a partisan role
as an invitation to counter-violence on
the part of challenging groups, we offer
this warning: Nurture whatever organi-
zational and structural constraints exist,
for you will find few normative con-
straints in the present American political
culture.
23. John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to
Political Protest: Chicago 1968," Public Opin-
ion Quarterly 34 (Spring 1970), 1-9.
